A coupling game is a new model for partly cooperative and partly non-cooperative games. This paper describes benefits that result when coupling rational cooperation, under some situations, is increased. We prove that if a coupling game is strictly rational and partly cooperative, the higher the coupling factors, the larger the social payoff, which is the sum of the payoffs of all players. Other properties of cooperation in coupling game theory and possible applications are discussed.
Introduction
Game theory has received substantial attention in recent years. In applications of game theory, a first step is to model the cases in the real world as accurately as possible. Currently cooperative games, non-cooperative games, and constant-sum games are used to describe real-world situations (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947 , Nash 1950 , 1951 , Tucker 1980 . Wei and Cruz (2006a) proposed a coupling game model that can mathematically model auxiliary non-mainstream information discarded by ideal game models and analyze these ''non-ideal'' cases quantitatively. In that paper, the concepts of coupling game, the relationship between coupling game and ideal game models, coupling factor, rational games, possible applications, and a pure strategy existence theorem were introduced.
In this paper we briefly review the concepts and we provide properties of coupling games. In particular, we prove that under certain conditions, when the players are strictly rational and if cooperation in the coupling game is increased, the sum of the payoffs is increased, although the strategies are calculated as non-cooperative strategies in the context of coupling game theory.
Rational cooperation
2.1 Basic concepts of coupling game 2.1.1 Motivation. At the highest level, a game can be seen as a multiple decision maker problem, or a multiagent control problem. Cooperative game theory and non-cooperative game theory are the two most important branches of existing game theory. For current cooperative game theory, there are usually two subbranches depending on whether the game allows side payments (Nash 1950) or not. If the game allows side payments, it is called a transferable utility (TU) cooperative game, while the other sub-branch is called non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative game. TU game theory is often used to analyze team games.
Non-cooperative game theory assumes that players will focus only on their own cost or payoff, and they are neutral about the costs of other players. Thus each player will pursue the maximum of its payoff or the minimum of its cost in this paper, this is called 100% non-cooperative game or 100% selfish game.
TU cooperative game theory assumes that each player considers that all players are in an ideal team. Each of the players will consider the other players' payoffs or costs at the same importance level as his or her own payoff or cost, and pursue the maximum of the total team payoff or the minimum of the total team cost. In this paper, this is called 100% cooperative game.
However, there are situations that are partly characterized as non-cooperative games and partly characterized as cooperative games. Imperfect communication links among unmanned aerospace vehicles (UAVs) or cooperation benefit/risk among companies/countries might result in this. A player might know that there is cooperation among players, but at the same time, he or she might not want to consider the other players' payoffs or costs at the same importance level as his or her own payoffs or costs. A mother and daughter might be very close to be in an ideal team, but two ordinary friends might not have such a strong feeling of ''payoff community'' and cannot absolutely trust each other. In other words, there might be ''non-ideal'' cases situated between ''100% cooperative game'' and ''100% non-cooperative game'', in which perfect cooperation can not be guaranteed due to subjective intents, objective coordination obstacles, or imperfect cooperation creditability. Can we formulate a new game theory which can mathematically model and analyse these ''non-ideal'' cases?
Another motivation comes from the fact that logic-similar games might have different results. We use the following two prisoner's dilemma games to illustrate the importance of different inducements and risks.
Example 1: Two logic-similar games are described in tables 1 and 2. Players are trying to maximize their payoffs.
According to current game theories, for both games, cell 1 is always the non-cooperative solution (for each player, choosing strategy A is always better than choosing B, since she only wishes to maximize her own payoff), and cell 4 is always the TU cooperative solution (each player simply pursues the maximum of the sum of their payoffs). When current game theory is used to analyze the two games, exactly the same suggestions for the two games will be obtained because the two games are actually logic-similar. However, in game 2, for both players, the inducement for non-cooperation (choosing A) is very large when compared with game 1. In real world situations, the possibility that two ordinary friends reach cell 1 for game 2 will be much larger than the possibility that they reach cell 1 of game 1, even when the two players explicitly know that for these two games current game theory suggestions are exactly the same. This is to say, in these two games there might be some important factor that has not been modelled by current game theories, and users can instinctively distinguish between these two games but current game theories could not. In this paper we will see that a non-cooperative coupling game (NCCG) with a coupling factor model (CFM) will be able to refine current game theories and help decision makers (or game players) make decisions more quantitatively, more mathematically and more precisely.
2.1.2 Coupling factor model. Suppose there is a game in which there are D decision makers and the decision makers' objectives are payoffs that will be maximized. We will use
. n d represents the number of possible choices for player d. We will use
. Here i k is the kth player's choice index and possible k might be 1, 2, . . . , n k . For simplification, we usẽ P ¼ ðP
The coupling game transformation equation (CGTE) is as follows: After applying (1), a new game is constructed and the new game will be solved only with current noncooperative game theory. The game strategy described up to now is called Non-Cooperative Coupling Game Strategy (NCCGS). Note that although we only apply current non-cooperative game theory to solve the new game, according to different parameters, the results might be cooperative equilibriums, non-cooperative equilibriums, zero-sum equilibriums, and other complex equilibrium, such as adversarial equilibriums. In this sense several popular existing game theories can be unified. For detailed explanation and proof, see Wei and Cruz (2006a) . It might be helpful to use figure 1 (from player 1's view) to illustrate a simple symmetric 2-player case. Note that for this game plane we assume that the relationship is symmetric, that is, if player 1 sets w 11 ¼ w 22 and w 12 ¼ w 21 , player 2 will set w 22 ¼ w 11 and w 21 ¼ w 12 .
Example 2 : It is illustrative to use the NCCGS to  analyze game table 1 and game table 2 in section 1. For  game table 1 , after applying (1), we will have the new Coupling Game described in table 3 which will be analysed by non-cooperative game theory.
In table 3, w j 1 j 2 can be explained as the coefficient that reflects the importance level of player j 2 's raw payoff from the perspective of player j 1 . If we want to ensure that cell 4 be reached as an equilibrium point, we need to have 
We can see that to reach cell 4, each player only needs to think of the other player's payoff to be more than 0.0002 times his or her own payoff. Although this is a prisoner's dilemma, it is very easy to reach a cooperative ''altruistic'' solution, for this cooperation only needs very weak ''friendship''. If we analze game table 2 with the same procedure, we will need w 12 ! (9999w 11 /10001) and w 21 ! (9999w 22 / 10001). We can see that to reach cell 4, each player will need to think of the other player's payoff as more than 0.9998 times his or her own payoff. This means that for game table 2, to reach cell 4 requires a very solid friendship between the two players and each player should think of the other player's payoff as almost at the same importance level as his or her own payoff.
If we analyze game table 1 with w 12 ¼ 0 and w 11 ¼ w 21 ¼ w 22 ¼ 1, which is somewhat like a relationship between a mother and a baby, the coupling game will have cell 2 as the equilibrium. This choice can not be reached by traditional cooperative or non-cooperative games.
Now we can see that CGTE explains why by common sense most decision makers might make totally different choices for these two logic-similar dilemmas. In other words, CGTE mathematically models the fact that if there is a large inducement for non-cooperation between two people, they may become enemies even if they are originally very good friends. Furthermore, CGTE could lead to an equilibrium point that is neither cooperative nor non-cooperative. For details, see Wei and Cruz (2006a) .
It might be difficult to get true values for the coupling factors, but in many cases, to solve the problem we do not need precise estimates. For example, for the two prisoners' dilemmas in x 1, it might not be easy for the two friends to determine whether the coupling factors are 0.1, 0.2, or 0.6. However, it is much easier to determine whether the coupling factors are larger than 0.0002 or smaller than 0.9998, and we just need this rough information to make correct suggestions for the decision makers. In addition, in many real world situations, it is not difficult to know the signs of coupling factors, and sometimes the approximate ranges or amplitudes of coupling factors are also available. In these cases, it is possible to build up some fuzzy set (Zadeh 1965 ) like ''negative large'', ''negative small'', ''zero'', ''positive small'', and ''positive large'' to get some applicable values for coupling factors. Applying different coupling factors, coupling game models can unify TU cooperative game model (Nash 1950) , non-cooperative game model, and constant-sum game model, and can deal with many non-ideal (Wei and Cruz 2006a) game situations that are not easily described in traditional game theory in a straightforward way. We first introduce three remarks here. For detailed explanation and proof, see Wei and Cruz (2006a) .
If player d's coupling factor vector w d ¼ ½w d1 w d2 Á Á Á w dD satisfies w dd > 0, player d is called a rational player. Specifically, if player d's coupling factor vector satisfies w dd ! |w di | ! 0 and w dd > 0 for i ¼ 1, 2, . . . , D, player d will be called a strictly rational player. A player whose coupling factor vector does not satisfy w dd > 0 is called a non-rational player. For the D-player case, if all players are rational players, the game is called D-player rational game, and the corresponding coupling factor matrix is called rational coupling factor matrix. Otherwise, the game is called D-player non-rational game. If all coupling factors in a coupling factor matrix are positive, the coupling factor matrix is called cooperative coupling factor matrix.
2.1.3 Explanations. The procedure for applying coupling game is: players construct a new game which considers the influences of cooperation or hostility, and then make decisions according to the new game and existing non-cooperative game theory. After the new coupling game is constructed, the algorithm for determining equilibria is exactly the same as that for Nash equilibria in existing pure strategy or mixed strategy non-cooperative game theory. 
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A possible question is: we are unifying adversarial game, non-cooperative game, and cooperative game, but why should we only use non-cooperative game theory to analyze the reconstructed game? Why is the non-cooperative game so exceptional?
To answer this question, we review the logic of the coupling factor model and the relationship among the three game theories. Non-cooperative game means being neutral about the other player's payoff or cost. The coupling factor model adds the influence of other player's payoff or cost. After this, using non-cooperative game theory already considers the influences of cooperation or hostility. In other words, the coupling factor matrix can be interpreted as a ''decoupling'' matrix. The rationale behind this transformation is that when the original game cannot reflect actual relationships among players, an appropriate coupling factor matrix can decouple the relationships among all the players, thus helping players simplify the decision making procedure.
In addition, based on the game plane in figure 1, we can see that non-cooperative game is somewhat ''neutral'' between adversarial game and cooperative game, while the other two are converse to each other. If we apply non-cooperative game theory to the newly constructed game, we can see that it can contain the adversarial game and cooperative game as two special cases corresponding to two extremes for converse directions. If we use cooperative game theory to analyze the newly constructed game, it cannot reach the other end, that is, the adversarial game.
For applications of coupling game, here we only give some rough descriptions. For details, see Wei and Cruz (2006b) . There are at least two types of typical potential applications for coupling game theory. The first is for the case that the coupling factors are fixed. In this case, the coupling factors among the players have (fixed) true values. Assume two players face a game like game table 4. They have to make decisions based on the current coupling factors so that they can mathematically balance risks and benefits. If both players know that the coupling factors in is approximately between 1/2 and 2/ 3, according to the coupling game theory, they will know that choosing strategy B is a good choice for them.
The other application track is to help ''adjust'' coupling factors to desired values. The simplest example might be as follows. Suppose two countries that were previous enemies know someday they will face a prisoner's dilemma whose logic is like the game in table 4. They want to avoid cell 1, which is the noncooperative equilibrium. Both players understand that it is too difficult for them to be military allies that can lead to cell 9 (which is the TU cooperative equilibrium), but they still want to be economic allies so that they might be able to reach cooperative cell 5. Although currently there is no war between them, they both know that the relationship between them has not been good. They are not sure whether the decision makers in the two countries will oppose this idea severely.
They know that if they want to ensure cell 5 as the final result, the coupling factors at that time should be larger than some thresholds. To ensure this, they might want to ameliorate the relationship between them with some adaptive reciprocal activities. Suppose an earthquake occurs in country A. Country B immediately offers aid to country A. Country A immediately accepts the aid and expresses gratitude to country B. In this way they might begin to improve coupling factors. Once the expected thresholds are reached, a possible lasting economic alliance may be achieved.
Similarly, some religions and governments want to teach people to love one another. These efforts are also procedures to improve coupling factors. The higher the coupling factors are, the easier to recruit volunteers for highly risky jobs.
There are also possible applications regarding the evaluation and prevention of suicide bombing terrorists. In many cases suicide bombing terrorists are volunteers for enemies. Using NCCG, one can calculate the threshold for a person to be a suicide bomber. Knowing this threshold might give out very important guidelines for people who do not want to see too many suicide bombers among enemies. Possible prevention strategies might be the reduction of enmity, giving proper benefits to those people, etc. Using NCCG, the amount of money and energy needed for these strategies can be calculated according to the expected goal.
Rational cooperation theorems
Coupling game can be easily extended to differential games (Isaacs 1965) , as long as each
) is differentiable. Note that here we do not have index subscripts because objective functions and input spaces are continuous now. In this subsection we present rational cooperation theorem about the improvement of social payoff in a differential background. Since in this subsection there are mainly complex function analyses, for symbols we adapt to traditional mathematical style. For example, we can use
Þ for a two-player case, which might make related mathematical induction look neater and more familiar. In addition, in many real world applications, we only care about the games located in the right half plane (we can call it rational semi-plane) of figure 1. For such cases, it might be more illustrative to use a normalized formula with less coupling factors
where À1 w i þ1, i ¼ 1, 2. Based on such simplified cases, we introduce Theorem 1. According to Theorem 1, under some conditions, better cooperation leads to higher raw social payoff. ) 2 X, X is a convex set, and X R 2 hold, it is known that the following three conditions hold simultaneously: 
and
2 Þ holds, and the equality holds if and only if ðx
The proof will be divided into proving three lemmas and the sketch is as follows. First we apply bivariate Taylor series six times (at two different levels) to prove the conclusion is true for a small enough neighbourhood if the coordinate changes are small enough. Then we prove that when the changes of coupling factors go to zeroes, the changes of the coordinates of the Nash equilibriums will also go to zero. Finally we prove that the conclusion is true not only in a neighbourhood, but also in the whole region which is determined by 0 w 
Þ will have unique maximums, where, i, k ¼ 1 or 2 and j, l ¼ a or b. In addition, the maximums can be determined by (respectively)
Applying bivariate Taylor series, we have
616 M. Wei and J. B. Cruz where oð 1 Þ is a bivariate second order term. Due to condition (a), the left-side of (9) is ''bivariate concave in X'', and oð 1 Þ is negative. We first consider the cases that w a 1 À w a 2 6 ¼ 0 and w b 1 À w b 2 6 ¼ 0 hold simultaneously. For the case that both of them are zeroes Theorem 1 will be obvious. The trivial cases that one of them is zero will be discussed at the end of the proof of this lemma.
We use bivariate Taylor series again and get
where O( 2 ) is a bivariate higher order item than second-order, and M is a symbol for simplification. The reason why ð@
According to (8), we have
With the help of (11), we apply bivariate Taylor series similarly and get
Combining (10) and (13), we get
That is
Similarly, assuming
Based on (9), combining (15) and (16), we get
,
Since the given condition (a) makes the left-side of (17) ''bivariate concave in X'', we can see that if absolute values of (x a 2 À x a 1 ) and (x b 2 À x b 1 ) is close enough to 0 (but not exactly 0), the sign of M c and N c will be dominated by the first two negative 2-order approximation items. This is to say, M c and N c will be negative in that small right interval. Since o( 1 ) is also negative, this means that ) are zeroes, directly from zero derivatives, clearly (18) will be exactly an equality. These imply what we want to prove is true for such a small change of (x a À x a ) and later we might be able to extend the result to a wider and more general interval. Heretofore, the problem becomes how to prove (x 
2 Þ in (9) will be directly 0. In this case, the procedure illustrated by (10)-(15) will be only applied to w 
Proof: We rewrite the first equation in (7) and the first equation in (8) as
Since f 2 has second-order derivative and is concave, Combining Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we prove Theorem 1. Extending Theorem 1 to dynamic situations is still an open problem because of the possible cross terms between the inputs of different players, which will not satisfy condition (a) in Theorem 1. However, in some special real-world applications about dynamic situations, the extension might be straightforward.
In Cruz et al. (2003) , sub-optimal game strategies were proposed for the salvo sizes of UAV teams, in which there are to-be-determined constant parameters, say, chosen by Team A and chosen by Team B. After applying that strategy, the overall payoff functions for blue and red will be functions of and as stated in (29)
(29) can be considered as a static game for choosing and . If such game structure is applied on a cooperative background (Cruz et al. 2003) , considering as x a and as x b , Theorem 1 can be directly applied. In some cases, the range of the new equilibrium in rational scenario can be determined. This helps players know whether the new equilibrium is in a feasible solution region.
Theorem 2: If all conditions assumed in Theorem 1 are satisfied, and in addition (30) and (31) hold simultaneously
Then the point (x a** , x b** ) which is determined by
Role of cooperation in coupling game theorywill be in the region stated in (33) 
which implies (36)
This is a contradiction. If 
simultaneously,
holds, and the equality in (39) holds if and only if ðx (5) and (6) as (40) and (41), respectively
Applying Theorem 1, the corollary is proved. oe
Corollary 1 says that even if players wish to measure the sum under different scales, as long as the scales satisfy some conditions, the benefit of better strictly rational cooperation is always guaranteed. A special but important case is symmetric coupling mode, which means that w 
holds, and the equality holds if and only if ðx (43) and is based mainly on multiplication where
All symbols in (43) can be explained in a similar way as in (1). Correspondingly, we will have a proposition similar to Theorem 1, which is stated as Theorem 3.
Theorem 3: Assume that for two twice-differentiable bivariate functions f 1 (x a , x b ) and f 2 (x a , x b ), where x a and x b are scalar input variables such that ðx a , x b Þ 2 X, X is a convex set, and X R 2 hold, it is known that 
Then f 
Þ, we will see that both R 1 (x a , x b ) and R 2 (x a , x b ) are bivariate concave. This is because (please note that f 1 and f 2 are positive and concave in X)
and similarly for R 2 (x a , x b ). This implies that both
) and R 2 (x a , x b ) are concave in X and we can directly apply the proof of Theorem 1. oe
Clearly, for multiplication payoff situations, results similar to Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 can be obtained easily.
More general cases
In many real world game situations, if players care more about other player's interests, the social payoff (the sum of the players' payoffs) at the equilibrium, which will be divided among all the players, might also be larger.
In special cases as stated in Theorem 1, the overall cooperation benefit can be guaranteed, which means a larger sum of players' payoffs at the equilibrium is ensured for stronger strictly rational cooperation. However, for general cases, such that the payoff functions are not additive and not concave, not all stronger strictly rational cooperation can ensure larger social payoff. The game array shown in table 5 An important and useful fact is that based on a large amount of Matlab simulation that assigns all game payoffs and coupling factors randomly, it seems that most strictly rational cooperation does improve (or at least not do harm to) the payoff sum. The simulation shows that in more than 99% of the situations, if there is a difference between the Nash sums reached via two different sets of coupling factors, the largest Nash social payoff (scaled in original payoff) reached via larger strictly rational coupling factors will be larger than the largest Nash social payoff (scaled in original payoff) reached via smaller strictly rational coupling factors. This confirms the common sense that better strictly rational cooperation mostly leads to greater social payoff. In addition, it might imply that Theorem 1 is also true in a larger scope than the range specified by conditions in Theorem 1. Figure 2 is the result of the simulation. The horizontal axis is the number of feasible control strategies of each player. The higher the number is, the more complex the game is. For each number we simulated 1000 times and calculate the percentage that better strictly rational cooperation can lead to higher social payoff. We can see that no matter how complex the game is, in no less than 99.2% of simulated cases, better cooperation leads to higher social payoff. P b** hold simultaneously. This implies that an individual player might not be able to get benefit from the enlarged payoff sum. This is the reason why many players are reluctant to take into account other players' payoffs.
In such situations it is still possible to have some cooperation. For a two-player game, they might be able to sign a contract as (49) to calculate their final payoffs (P a*** , P b*** ) after compensation
where the function r(x) is defined as
The basic procedure of applying a coupling compensation strategy is as follows. Each player first runs a scenario of a ''more ideal'' team with the other player, which means that both players set the coupling factors ðw 1 Þ, which are the coupling factors both players originally wish to set. Suppose under some conditions P a* þ P b* P a** þ P b** hold but P a* > P a** hold, too. In this case, the other player (player B) should compensate for player A so that player A will restore at least the amount that can be guaranteed by the coupling factors ðw 
Bottom-line compensation strategy
According to the bottom-line game model introduced in Wei and Cruz (2006b) , there exist cases in which two players might both refuse to reduce the dividing proportions before the game starts but they still wish to have cooperation as strongly as they can. Player d would ask for proportion l The ratio that stronger rational cooperation causes larger sum
The number of the rows of the game matrix (square)
Ratio of larger sum Figure 2 . The ratio that stronger strictly rational cooperation causes larger sum if there is difference between the sums.
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The fundamental calculation formula is as follows:
where the function r(x) is defined similarly as in (48). ij is the index of the 2-dimension game array. l After using (50) to transform an OGA into BLGA, the two players can make decisions according to traditional Non-Cooperative game theory. For details please see Wei and Cruz (2006b) . Note that the sharing creditability in Wei and Cruz (2006b) is different from credibility discussed by Schelling (1966 Schelling ( , 2001 .
According to the bottom-line game theory, one player might refuse to give up more than the amount that the contract requires, which means that in many cases one player will not be willing to negotiate further and the game will stop at some guaranteed payoff Nash equilibrium, say ðP (Nash 1950) , say ðP 1 Ã , P 2 Ã Þ, will be no less than the sum of the payoffs of any Nash solution, especially for a prisoner's dilemma (Tucker 1980) . This implies that there might exist a larger payoff sum to be divided between the two players. However, since the to-be-determined disagreement, at the TU cooperation solution one player (say player 1) might get less than P 1b Ã . This leads to an obstacle to reaching such a TU cooperation solution.
In this case, if the two players can sign an additional contract in which P 1b Ã and P 2b Ã are used as compensation baselines, better cooperation might be possible. The additional contract that calculates the compensated guaranteed payoffs (P 1b ÃÃ , P 2b ÃÃ ) can be as follows P The basic procedure of applying bottom-line compensation strategy is as follows. Suppose there is an unknown coming future game that players only can take the expectation but not sure about disturbances, and once both players enter the game and have to make decision, they can not communicate with each other.
Before the game starts, the two players can sign two contracts as (50) and (51) stated. After they enter the game, both players choose the strategy that corresponds to the maximum of sums of the team payoff expectations. After the game ends, the game parameters will be determined and (51) can be applied. If one player, say player 1, get less than he or she should get via the Nash reached by bottom-line game strategy, player 2 should compensate player 1 so that player 1 will at least be able to restore the original guaranteed payoff. If player 1 still can not achieve the guaranteed payoff, player 2 should at least give up the excess amount that is more than he or she should get via the bottom-line game strategy. Since in many cases even after this kind of compensation player 2 will still have some leftover, it is possible that under these situations both players are willing to sign and abide by such a contract to induce cooperation.
Conclusion
In this paper we proved that strictly rational cooperation can ensure a larger social payoff (the payoff sum of all players) under some conditions when cooperation is increased. Some important extensions of this result are introduced and proved. Compensation strategies that might be able to induce greater cooperation are discussed. We have provided some deeper insight in the role of cooperation in NCCGS and bottom-line game strategies.
